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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE 1\1:ATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF
RIGHTS TO THE USE OF ALL
WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, IN
THE ESCALANTE VALLEY
DRAINAGE AREA,
In re: Water User's Claim No. 542,
Underground Water Claim No.
17173, R. L. Bradshaw Claimant,
George C. Goodwin, Successor.
GEORGE C. GOODWIN,
Plaintiff a.nd Appellant,
-vs.JOSEPH M. TRACY, State Engineer of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent

Case
No. 8567

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State Engineer of the State of Utah, as the
respondent herein, is in complete agreement with the
statement of the case and the statement of facts as set
forth in the brief of the appellant, but we do differ both
1
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as to the materiality of those facts and as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom; and, at the outset, we
feel compelled to call the Court's attention to the fact
that the respondent here has no personal or individual
interest in the subject matter and is the respondent
solely by reason of his official capacity. If this were
a matter involving a surface stream, we are confident
that there would be a considerable number of lower
users who would be contesting this cause along with the
present respondent. However, the water source here involved is a rather large underground water basin and
no one individual appears able to realize that every
diversion therefrom, no matter how small, has some
effect upon the water that will be available to him
now and in the future. The District Court has, therefore,
charged the office of the State Engineer with the defense
of all matters of this kind in the area and this Court
should view the problems here presented not in the
light of the theory presented by the State Engineer as an
abstract proposition but as an actual factual situation,
the solution to which will have an immediate and substantial impact upon several hundred water users in this
area.
We should also call the Court's attention to the fact
that the interlocutory order of the trial court allowed
the appellant the right to irrigate some 28 acres. The
appellant claimed the right to irrigate about· 70 acres,
but the respondent State Engineer took the position that
the appellant had no right to irrigate any land and ""e
shall hereafter demonstrate that not only can the judg2
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ment of the trial court be supported but the trial court
actually went too far in allowing the 28 acres.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THERE IS SPECIFIC STATUTORY
AUTHORITY FOR THE STATE ENGINEER
AND THE COURT TO LIMIT THE ACREAGE
TO BE IRRIGATED FROM A WELL DRILLED
PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE UNDERGROUND WATER LAW OF UTAH IN
MARCH, 1935; AND THE CONTENTION OF
THE RESPONDENT STATE ENGINEER
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED
TO NO IRRIGATION FROM SAID WELI.J
WAS PROPER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
UPHELD.
POINT II
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THE
CLAIMANT APPELLANT CAN BE LIMITED
TO THE ACREAGE UNDER CULTIVATION
IN 1942 AND THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN AWARDING THE
CLAIMANT 28 ACRES IS PROPER AND IS
ENTITLED TO AFFIRMANCE BY THIS
COURT.
POINT III
THAT THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL
COURT WITH RESPECT TO APPLICATION
NO. 11870 IS PROPER AJ:+;TD SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THERE IS SPECIFIC STATUTORY
AUTHORITY FOR THE STATE ENGINEER
AND THE COURT TO LIMIT THE ACREAGE
TO BE IRRIGATED FROM A WELL DRILLED
PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE UNDERGROUND WATER LAW OF UTAH IN
MARCH, 1935; AND THE CONTENTION OF
THE RESPONDENT STATE ENGINEER
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED
TO NO IRRIGATION FROM SAID WELL
WAS PROPER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
UPHELD.
Points I and II of the respondent's brief are directed
at Point I, subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of appellant's
brief but we have separated them for argument as we
feel that this adds clarity to the problems that require
the consideration of this Court. The questions of law here
involved can best be arrived at by a chronological statement of the statutes and the Yarious changes that have
been 1nade and together 'Yith comment and citation of the
cases that have been decided.
We would at the outset state that the issue before
this Court is simply whether the enactment of the underground ''Tater la"T by the 1935 Legislature intended to
retain the intent theory and permit enlargement of the
underground "Tater right indefinitely until that intent
had been accomplished or "Thether the legislature abolished the intent theory and required all further enlargement of the right to be carried on under the supervision
4
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and control of the State Engineer. We are convinced
that the latter is the only correct theory and that, to give
the legislative enactment any other construction, would
lead to a most chaotic situation.
In 1903, the Fifth Regular Session of the Utah Legislature enacted what was designated as Chapter 100,
consisting of 73 sections, and this was the first real \Vater
code under \vhich water rights were initiated by application to the State Engineer; and section 35 of this chapter
provided that "any person, corporation or association,
to hereafter acquire the right to the use of any public
water in the State of Utah, shall before commencing the
construction, enlargement or extension of any ditch,
canal or other distributing works, or performing similar
work tending to acquire the said right or appropriation,
make an application in writing to the State Engineer,
which shall include a map, profile and drawings, as hereinafter provided.''
Section 72 of this same Chapter 100, Session Laws
of Utah, 1903, provided for the repeal of all prior water
laws and all other laws in conflict with this code, but it
also provided as follows : '' ... but such repeal shall not
affect any vested rights, and any person, corporation or
association who may have heretofore filed notice of
appropriation of water, or initiated any right under the
provisions of said (repealed) laws, may complete and
perfect such appropriation or right in the same manner
and with like effect as if this repeal had not been
m a de. " . ..
5
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We should also note that Section 34 of Chapter 100,
Session Laws of Utah, 1903, reads as follows: ''Rights to
the use of any of the unappropriated water in the State
may be acquired by appropriation in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation
must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, a!!d, as bet"reen appropriators, the one first in time shall be first
in right.''
These sections became Sections 100-3-2 and 100-3-1,
respectively, in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and
a careful comparison with that revision shows that no
substantial changes in the above quoted portions
had been made in either section during that thirtyyear period; and it should be here noted that no concept
of state ownership or control of underground water had
yet been promulgated, although by 1933 the cases of
Wrathal v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755, and Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 158, 40 P. 2d 802, were commenced
and were on their way to this Court. And the decision of
this Court in those two cases on January 2 and 10, 1935,
respectively, made necessary the changes in the laws
dealing with appropriation of water by the 1935 Legislature.
Section 100-3-1 of the 1933 Revised Laws was
amended by Chapter 105 of the 1935 Session Laws to read
as follows:
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public
waters in this state may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may
be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated
6
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and no notice of ttntent to appropriate shall be recognized except application for such appropriation
first be made to the state engineer in the manner
hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful and beneficial
purpose, and, as between appropriators, the one
first in time shall be first in right; provided, that
when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of the unappropriated waters of the
state would materially interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, the application shall be
dealt with as provided in section 100-3-8. ''

This section has not since been changed except for the
addition of the last sentence in the present section, which
is now Section 73-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
sentence was added by the Session Laws of 1939 and deals
with adverse use.
The important change made in 1935 was the addition of the second sentence which has been italicized in
the above quotation of the act and, for purposes of emphasis, may we point out that the legislature has said
that "no notice of intent to appropriate shall be recognized"; and this is clearly an indication that the old
theory of a right to complete an appropriation based upon
the intent when it was first begun was rejected by the
legislature in favor of appropriation only under the supervision and control of the State Engineer.
Further, Section 100-3-2 of the Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, and the part with which we are concerned was
amended by this same Chapter 105 of the 1935 Session
Laws to read as follows :

7
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"Any person who is a citizen of the United
States, or who has filed his declaration of intention
to become such as required by the naturalization
laws, or any association of such citizens or declarants, or any corporation, in order hereafter to
acquire the right to the use of any unappropriated
public water in this state shall, before commencing the construction, enlargement, extension or
structural alteration of any ditch, canal, well, tunnel or other distributing works, or performing
similar work tending to acquire such rights or appropriation, or enlargement of an existing right
or appropriation, make an application in writing
to the state engineer.''
The remainder of this section, which is now Section
73-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, has since been
changed in some detail, but the part above quoted has
since remained the law and we desire to call attention
specifically to the words contained in the last three lines
above quoted, and, at the risk of repetition but in order
to emphasize their importance in this issue, we again
quote them as follows :
''or enlargement of an existing right or appropriation make an application in writing to the
state engineer.''
Applying these statutes to the facts in the present
ease, "re find that the clai1nant appellant had drilled a
well in 1934 but had made no use thereof prior to the
enactment of the aboYe quoted acts in 1935 and their
effeetiYe date of l\Iarch ~~' 1935 ~ and the State Engineer has taken the position that the acts above quoted
requi r<.\d that this claimant file an application before he
8
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,,.a

had any right to the use of
ter from this well for any
irrigation purpose, as such use would clearly be an "enlargement of an existing right or appropriation.'' We
respectfully urge that this language of the statute, coupled with the clear and announced purpose of the legislature to reject and abolish the theory of intent as applied
to the appropriation of water, specifically provides the
procedure that must be followed by a water claimant and
conclusively demonstrates that the position taken by the
State Engineer in completely disallowing the claim
vYas sound and proper and the only position consistent
·with the statute that could be taken.
This case is a matter of first import in this state and
is of great importance not only to the office of the State
Engineer but to all owners of water rights from underground sources. The State Engineer is most concerned
as this Court's decision vvill directly affect the action of
that office in all adjudication proceedings now under way
and those to be undertaken in the future. And each
owner of a right to use water from underground sources
is interested either as he may or may not be given the
right to use more water and enlarge upon his right or as
he may find the water in his particular area protected
from further withdrawals or be subject to further depletion as the case may be.
The only case decided since 1935 touching upon this
subject is Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.
2d 255, and in this case the Court said:
"We, therefore, conclude and hold that the right
to the use of underground waters which prior
9
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to the Wrathall case were not considered the
subject of an appropriation, but which were therein held to be subject thereto, could be acquired
prior to the 1935 enactments and amendments of
our statutes on that subject by merely diverting
such waters from their natural source and placing
them to a beneficial use and that the plaintiff had,
prior to the filing of the application of the city
with the State Engineer, acquired a vested right
to the use of the waters flowing from his well to
the extent that he had placed them to a beneficial
use as hereinbefore indicated, and that by filing
his claim to such right to use such waters in accordance with the 1935 statute he has established
that right with a priority dating from his first
use.''
The statement of the Court in this case limiting the
right to the extent of the beneficial use made before the
effective date of the 1935 amendment is clearly in accord
with the position now taken by the State Engineer that
there could be no enlargement of any ''existing right or
a ppropria.tion'' after the 1935 amendment unless a
proper written application was made to the State
Engineer.
Some contention has and will be made that we are
attempting to apply this 1935 amendment retroactively
and that we are attempting to deprive this claimant of a
vested right. This is not so. In the first instance the statutes above quoted are procedural in nature and are
intended to provide for proper administration and distribution of water in this state to the end that there may
be a better beneficial use thereof by all concerned. And,
secondly, may \v·e call attention to the fact that on March

10
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22, 1935, every underground water user was given a full
right to the extent of his beneficial use on that date. N othing was taken from him; but he was thereafter required
to make proper application to the State Engineer if he
desired to enlarge upon his right, which is in reality a ne,~.r
appropriation.
And in futher support of our conention may we quote
Section 73-5-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which section was first enacted by the 1935 legislature as a part of
the then new underground water code, and which reads
as follows:
''Within one year after the date of the approval
of this act, all cla.iman.ts to rights to the use of
underground waters shall file notice of such claim
or claims, with the state engineer on forms furnished by him, setting forth such information as
the state engineer may require, including but not
limited to the following:
The name and postoffice of the person making
the claim; the location .of the well or tunnel or
other means of diversion with reference to a United States government survey corner; the nature
and extent of use on which claim of appropriation
is based ; the flow of underground water used in
cubic feet per second or the quantity in acre-feet;
the time during which underground water has
been used each year and the date when underground water was first used.
Failure to file notice of claim or claims, as provided in this section, shall be prima facie evidence
of intent to abandon such claimed right or rights,
and in the distribution of the underground waters
of this state, the state engineer may disregard
any claim not so filed. ' '
11
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In connection with this section, we have italicized certain words and phrases that again preclude any thought
that the claimant had any unlimited time in which to complete his appropriation; and, certainly, the fact that he
\Vas to file within the year a statement of his claim can
have no significance and no meaning if that same claimant were entitled to an additional :fifteen years, as claimed
by the present appellant, to complete his appropriation
and fulfill what he claims to have been his original
intention.
And, finally, in connection with this matter, may we
reiterate that in 1903 the legislature specifically provided
for completion and perfection of rights that had theretofore been initiated \Yithout compliance with the water
code then enacted. No similar provision is contained in
the 1935 act and we believe that this is a. complete answer
to appellant's statement on page 21 of his brief and is
again conclusive proof that it \Yas the legislative intention to require all use of water from that date on to be
under the supervision and control of the State Engineer.
At this point "Te "~ould refer the Court to the Proposed Determination of Water Rights in the Esc-alante
Valley Drainage Area \Yhich \Yas filed \Yith the District
Court in Iron County on ~\._pril 1, 1949, and which is a
part of the record in this cause. Contained \vithin this
I>ropoHed Dt~termination and cominencing on page 204
a11d concluding on page 269 are listed the rights to the
use of und0rground \Ynter that \Yere initiated prior to
1935. It haH bet)u computed that the total of these rights

12
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is for the irrigation of 6300 acres with a right of withdrawal of 107 second-feet of water. The right here claimed
of 1.0 second-foot to irrigate 70 acres seems small in comparison, but becomes of considerable magnitude when one
considers that there are a considerable number of water
users, each of whom seek by similar protest, the right to
enlarge over the use that existed in 1935.
There is in the present matter before the Court no
complaint by any junior appropriator or any other user
of water within this underground area as to this claimed
right to enlarge his use by the appellant herein; but the
State Engineer believed, and the District Court confirmed
this belief into a fact, that in these general adjudication
proceedings, and particularly where underground water
was concerned and a contest has developed, the State Engineer not only represents the State of Utah but of necessity represents all other 'vater claimants in the area.
VVe are required to take and defend such a position as
the claimants within the area expect that we will defend
and uphold the Proposed Determination as presented and
we are also vitally interested in all matters of this type
inasmuch as the final ruling will do much to determine
the existence or non-existence of unappropriated water
within the source.
The cases of Becker v. Marble Creek Irrigation Co.,
15 Utah 225, 49 Pac. 892, Hague v. Nephi Irrigation Co.,
16 Utah 421, 52 Pac. 765, Gunnison Irrigation. Co. v. Gunnison Highland Ca;nal Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852 and
Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356, 289 Pac. 1097,
13
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are each discussed under Point II of this brief, but we
feel that the language used and hereafter quoted in those
cases is equally applicable to the matters herein discussed
and we earnestly hope that this Court will so consider it.
And, in conclusion of this part of the argument, may
we refer to the recent case of Bishop v. Duck Creek Irriga.tion Co., 121 Utah 290, 241 P. 2d 162. In that case the
proof available went back only to 1906 and the court
accepted such use and adjudicated the rights based on
such use. No reference was made to any right of enlargement or to any reasonable period therefor, but this
Court did make this statement: "Since there are no filings with the State Engineer either by Bishop or his predecessors, whatever right he has to the water must
necessarily rest upon appropriation by beneficial use
before 1903. Prior to that time the law allowed appropriation by such use, and statutes enacted that year preserve such appropriations.''
POINT II
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THE
CLAIMANT APPELLANT CAN BE LIMITED
TO THE ACREAGE UNDER CULTIVATION
IN 1942 AND THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN AWARDING THE
CLAIMANT 28 ACRES IS PROPER AND IS
ENTITLED TO AFFIRMANCE BY THIS
COURT.
The matters discussed under this point would become moot if the Court were to agree "~ith the position

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

taken by the respondent under Point I, but we also
earnestly contend and urge that the decision of the District Court can and should be upheld without regard to
Point I as far as the Appellant is concerned although
the acreage so allowed is contrary to the position taken by
respondent and in excess of that which which the respondent believes should have been allowed.
We believe it patently unfair to the trial court to
assume that he chose a seven-year period as a reasonable
time to call a halt to further enlargements solely because
the State Engineer had surveyed the acreage in question
at the end of such period. The trial court had before him
not only the protest of this claimant appellant but a considerable number of other protests from other water
users within the area covered by the Proposed Determination and he had before him that Proposed Determination which constituted an exhaustive survey and compilation of all water rights in the area; and these matters,
coupled with the known reluctance both then and now of
State Engineers to approve applications in this underground area because of the belief that the area may be
overappropriated, would in and of themselves furnish
sufficient grounds to support the trial court's finding
that a seven-year period was a sufficiently long period in
which the appellant should and must have completed his
original intention. To hold otherwise in an area where
the development was proceeding at a rapid pace and
where a great number of other water users were also
involved, would be to invite chaos and confusion.

15
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This Court has many times stated and held that it
will not on appeal disturb the findings of the trial court
if there is any substantial evidence supporting those findings ; and we believe that this statement is the more compelling when the decision of the trial court concerns the
question of the reasonableness of a particular matter or
thing. This Court has on many occasions stated that the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the findings of trial court and two of the latest cases so
stating and holding are Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d, 127,
262 P. 2d 760, and Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres,
4 Utah 2d. 181, 290 P. 2d 689. And for these compelling
reasons, Finding No. 2 by the trial court is proper and it
and the conclusion that it supports are entitled to affirmance by this Court. It appears proper to comment here
that what might be a reasonable time to complete an
appropriation in an area where development was slow
and the area isolated and the water users few, could very
well be an unreasonable time in an area of large development by a great number of water users; and the Milford underground 'vater basin is a small area that has
had a large development by many ,,~ater users.
There ha Ye been no cases decided b~~ this Court that
have specifically covered this question of a reasonable
time for development eYen under the surface "Tater
rights, but \Ye are con,~inred that the cases cited under
Point I on page 13 of this brief are most indicatiYe of
th(_i vie\Y thnt has been taken and are most compelling
as to the ruling that ought to be made. The early case of
Becke1· r. 1ll arble Creek Irrigation Co., supra, decided in
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1897, is of the utmost importance, and in that case this
Court said:
"The waters of a prior appropriator are fixed
by the extent of his appropriation for a beneficial
use, and others may subsequently appropriate any
water of a stream not so used by a prior appropriator; and such latter appropriation becomes a
vested right, and entitled to as much protection
as the former, and a right of which he cannot be
deprived except by voluntary alienation, or forfeiture by abandonment. The rights of the former
being thus fixed, he cannot enlarge his rights to
the detriment of the latter by increasing his demands, or by extending his use to other lands, even
if used for a beneficial purpose.''
One year later in 1898, the case of Hague v. Nephi
Irrigation Co., supra, was decided by this Court and the
following quotation, although somewhat lengthy, so
clearly states the proposition for which we are contending
that 've are compelled to quote it:
"The object and intention, under the law, in diverting water, must be to apply it to some useful
purpose, and if by means of ditches more is diverted than is necessary for such purpose, the
excess cannot be regarded as a diversion for a
useful purpose; for, as matter of fact, such
excess merely runs to waste, and its diversion cannot result in a vested right. If, therefore, A., who owns and intends to irrigate
but one acre of land, diverts all the water
of a natural stream, which is sufficient to irrigate
two acres, he obtains a right only to sufficient
water to irrigate his one acre, and B., who also
owns an acre, may appropriate the excess. If, in
this arid region, the law were otherwise, it would
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be a menace to the best interests of the state as
well as to its citizens, because it would enable a
few individuals, or association of individuals, by
diversion of water in excess of use, to greatly
limit the area of the public domain which could
be cultivated, and thus deprive the state of its
revenue, and citizens of homes within its borders.
This is exemplified in the case at bar, where 19
families settled upon public lands, and are now
represented as then having, in cultivating a comparatively few acres of land, diverted all the water
of the stream, which was then and is now sufficient
to irrigate thousands of acres, and to supply the
inhabitants of the city of Nephi with water for
culinary and domestic purposes. No such extravagance in the use of water was ever intended by the
enactment of the laws relating to the appropriation and use of water in the arid belt of the country. The extent of the appropriation is limited, no
matter how much water may have been diverted,
to the quantity necessary for the purposes for
which the appropriation is made, and the intention to apply it to some useful purpose, without
unnecessary delay, must also appear, in order to
confer upon the appropriator a vested right thereto. If there is no intention, on the part of the
appriator, to apply the water to such purpose,
within a. reasonable time, there is no valid appropriation, and the 'Yater remains subject to appropriation by otheas. So, where there is more
diverted than is necessary for the object of the
appropriation, there can be no intention to apply
the excess to a useful purpose, and such excess remains subject to appropriation. In Kin. Irr. S.
150, it is said: 'This intention goes to the very
foundation of the art of appropriation, and must
be evidenced by a constancy, or steadfastness of
purpose or labor, as is usual with men engaged in
like enterprises, 'vho desire a speedy accomplish-
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ment of their designs.' In Ortma.n v. Dixon, 13
Cal. 34, it was said: 'The measure of the right, as
to extent, follows the nature of the appropriation
or the uses for which it is taken. The intent to
take and appropriate the outward act go together.
If we concede that a man has right by mere priority to take as much water from a running stream
as he chooses, to be applied to such purposes as he
pleases, the question still arises, what did he
choose to take f And this depends upon the general and particular uses he makes of it. If, for instance, a man takes up water to irrigate his
meadow at certain seasons, the act of appropriation ,the means used to carry out the purpose, and
the use made of the water should qualify his right
of appropriation to a taking for a specific purpose,
and limit the quantity to that purpose, or so much
as necessary for it.' So in Canal Co. v. Kidd, 37
Cal. 282, Mr. Chief Justice Sawyer, after reference to a number of cases, observed: 'The doctrine
is that no man shall act upon the principle of the
dog in the manger, by claiming water by certain
preliminary acts, and from that moment prevent
others from enjoying that which he is himself unable or unwilling to enjoy, and thereby prevent
the development of the resources of the country
by others. Anybody else may divert and use all
the water, be it more or less, that a prior claimant is not in a present condition to use, and, by
lack of diligence on his part in pursuing a perfecting a prior inchoate right, many acquire rights
even superior to his.' Kin. Irr. pp. 151, 1953; MoKinney v. Smith, 21 Cal. 37 4; Combs v. Ditch Co.,
17 Colo. 146, 28 Pac. 966; Macris v. Bicknell, 7
Cal. 262; Water Co. v. Powell, 34 Cal. 110; Simpson v. Williams, 18 Nev. 432, 4 Pac. 1213."

In Gunnison Irrigation Co. v. Gunnison Highla;nd
Canal Co., supra, this statement was made:
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''In short, the rights of a prior appropriator are
measured and limited by the extent of his appropriation and application to a beneficial use. If he
diverts more water than under this doctrine he is
entitled to, he must return such surplus to the
stream for the use of subsequent appropriators.
No extension or enlargement of his rights as determined by the doctrine of beneficial use can be
made so as to interfere with the vested rights of
others.''
And in Jensen v. Birchr Creek Ranch, supra., this
Court said:
"It is also the settled law in this jurisdiction
that a prior appropriator of water from a natural
stream may not so increase his demand and use
of the water appropriated by him as to deprive a
subsequent appropriator of any right which he
may have acquired before such increased demand
and use is made by a prior appropriator."
The above language is particularly appropriate with respect to the issues no"'" before this Court.
The appellant has laid considerable stress upon the
failure of the State Engineer to lapse applications even
though there may have been as much as t\Yenty years
elapse since the actual filing of the application. We would
urge upon the Court that the difference bet,veen a controlled and superYised procedure under an application
and the unlimited, uncontrolled and unbounded right as
c1nimed by the nppellant is so great as to compel the conclusion that there can be and should be no attempt at
comparison. To state the proposition is to answer it.
Under appellant's theory, the amount of water he claims
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a right to pump from the well, the period during which
he claims a right of use and the total acreage he claims a
right to irrigate are tightly locked within his mind to be
revealed only when his full intention has been accomplished. It is indeed impossible to show a similarity between that approach and the orderly procedure under an
application, which in and of itself declares the limit beyond which the appropriator may not enlarge and which
requires either proof of appropriation at the end of a
specified period or a request for an extension of time
based upon an affidavit that the statute intends should
show a diligent effort towards completion of the appropriation. If the State Engineer is too lax in permitting
extensions, other water users in the area have an absolute
right to take the initiative under Section 73-3-13, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which section has been the law
since 1919 and reads as follows :
'' . A.ny other applicant or any user of water from
any river system or water source may protest
to the state engineer that such work is not being
diligently prosecuted to completion, whereupon
the state engineer shall give the applicant doing
such work or his assigns sixty days' notice by
registered mail to his last recorded address to
appear on a date to be designated and show cause,
if any he has, why his application shall not be
declared forfeited in whole or in part, and on such
date such applicant or his assigns shall be permitted to produce any lawful evidence tending to
sho'v compliance on his part with the law. At
such hearing the state engineer may hear and consider any and all competent evidence tending to
show whether or not the applicant or his assigns
have complied with the law. If diligence is not
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shown by the applicant the state engineer may
declare the application and all rights thereunder
forfeited. The decision of forfeiture shall be final
unless an action to review it is filed as provided
by section 73-3 . .14."
We submit that, except as the action of the trial
court exceeds what the respondent believes to be the law
as set forth in Point I, the findings and conclusions of the
trial court are proper, are fully supported both by the
facts and by the law and should be affirmed.

POINT III
THAT THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL
COURT WITH RESPECT TO APPLICATION
NO. 11870 IS PROPER AND SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
Appellant discusses this matter under his Point 1-d
and in effect says that he has been misled by the actions
and interpretations of the State Engineer to his damage
and that he should be made whole. In answer to this contention we would first say that, if the Court were to find
that this was true, we would greatly prefer that any
award to this appellant be made in this manner, as we
are fully and firmly convinced that to allow the appellant
any relief in any other manner does violence to the statutes and to the cases that we have cited; and we earnestly
hope that this Court agrees with our conclusion in this
respect. But we are not convinced that there was any
misleading as it clearly appears to us that all of the
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known facts were equally known both to the water users
and to the State Engineer at all times. We would specifically refer to Conclusion No. 3 made by the trial court
in this matter and also to page 12 of appellant's brief;
and it would appear that the belief of the then State Engineer in 1935 that there was no unappropriated water
and the reversal of that belief by a later State Engineer
in about the year 1944 were both widely communicated
to all water users within the area. Each user had similar
and identical facts before him and to hold that one was
misled would compel a conclusion that all were so misled;
and this is, of course, not correct. It would appear that
the correct conclusion is that the appellant in this matter
failed to exercise proper diligence both in his initial development and in not protecting himself with a proper
application following the change in practice in 1944.
CONCLUSION
The State Engineer did not appeal from the decision
of the District Court even though that holding was in a
way contrary to the position taken by the State Engineer
in that court as set out under Point I of this brief; but
we urge upon this Honorable Court that the decision of
the District Court should be affirmed for the reasons we
have set forth under either Point I or Point II of this
brief. With respect to the position of the appellant under
his Point 1-d and our answer under Point III of this brief,
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we urge that this Court give due consideration to the
matters submitted and exercise its sound discretion in
arriving at a conclusion.
Respectfully submitted:

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General

ROBERT B. PORTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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